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That commission did, in fact, sign off on a set of recommendations. Congress enacted nearly all of them. But it was not the Greenspan Commission that developed the action plan. It was a rubber stamp for a deal negotiated independently by representatives of President Reagan and of the Democratic leadership in the House of Representatives. And it was the impending insolvency of Social Security, which had led to the commission, that drove those negotiations.
In the words of the late Robert Ball, a pivotal member of the commission and a leading negotiator for the Democrats: "Nothing ... should obscure the fact that the National Commission on Social Security Reform was not an example of a successful bipartisan commission.
"'The commission itself stalled—essentially deadlocked, despite continuing to talk—after reaching agreement on the size of the problem that needed to be addressed. As a commission, that was as far as it got. The usual commission procedure was then turned on its head. An agreement was negotiated between the principals by proxy and then the already agreed-to result was taken back to the commission for its endorsement" (emphasis added).
Ball then goes on to draw lessons from this experience that apply directly to the proposed budget commission:
"'[T]o suggest that the Greenspan Commission provides a model for resolving questions about Social Security’s future would be laughable if it were not so dangerous . . . A commission is no substitute for principled commitment. Above all, we should not allow ourselves to fall into the trap of expecting miracles from another Greenspan commission—by deluding ourselves into believing, mistakenly, that the first one was a great success."
If progress is to be achieved in a budget commission, Republicans will have to put tax increases on the table and mean it. Unless they do, the budget commission will be a forum for time-wasting talk, and the clock on a fiscal crisis will continue to tick.
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Henry Aaron is the Bruce and Virginia MacLaury Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution. The views expressed here are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the trustees, officers, or other staff of the Brookings Institution